Fictional persuasion, transparency, and the aim of belief by Sullivan-Bissett, Ema & Bortolotti, Lisa
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 09/25/2017, SPi
9
Fictional Persuasion, Transparency, 
and the Aim of Belief
Ema Sullivan-Bissett and Lisa Bortolotti
In this chapter we argue that some beliefs present a problem for the truth-aim 
teleological account of belief, according to which it is constitutive of belief that it is 
aimed at truth. We draw on empirical literature which shows that subjects form beliefs 
about the real world when they read fictional narratives, even when those narratives 
are presented as fiction, and subjects are warned that the narratives may contain 
falsehoods. We consider Nishi Shah’s teleologist’s dilemma and a response to it from 
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen which appeals to weak truth regulation as a feature common 
to all belief. We argue that beliefs from fiction indicate that there is not a basic level of 
truth regulation common to all beliefs, and thus the teleologist’s dilemma remains.
We consider two objections to our argument. First, that the attitudes gained 
through reading fiction are not beliefs, and thus teleologists are not required to 
account for them in their theory. We respond to this concern by defending a doxastic 
account of the attitudes gained from fiction. Second, that these beliefs are in fact 
appropriately truth-aimed, insofar as readers form beliefs upon what they take to be 
author testimony. We respond to this concern by suggesting that the conditions 
under which one can form justified beliefs upon testimony are not met in the cases 
we discuss.
Lastly, we gesture towards a teleological account grounded in biological function, 
which is not vulnerable to our argument. We conclude that beliefs from fiction present 
a problem for the truth-aim teleological account of belief.
1 Beliefs from fiction
Here we give an overview of three experiments from the empirical literature showing 
that people acquire or change their beliefs about the real world upon engaging with 
fiction. Throughout the chapter we will use the term beliefs from fiction to refer to the 
attitudes formed by participants of these experiments.
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1.1 Transportation and belief change
Melanie Green and Timothy Brock investigated the effects of transportation, which is 
defined by them as ‘a distinct mental process, an integrative melding of attention, 
imagery, and feelings’ and hypothesized to be ‘a mechanism whereby narratives can 
affect beliefs’ (Green and Brock 2000: 701). They identify as a consequence of trans-
portation that ‘parts of the world of origin become inaccessible . . . the reader loses 
access to some real-world facts in favor of accepting the narrative world that the 
author has created’ (ibid. 702). We focus here on the first of three experiments in which 
Green and Brock measured how participants’ beliefs were changed as a result of 
transportation into a narrative.
Participants read a story about a young girl who goes shopping with her sister and 
gets stabbed to death by a patient who has escaped from a psychiatric facility. Green 
and Brock devised a transportation scale which included eleven general items (e.g. 
‘I was mentally involved in the narrative while reading it’) and four narrative specific 
items (e.g. ‘While reading the narrative I had a vivid image of Katie’), which were 
measured using a seven point scale from ‘very much’ to ‘not at all’ (ibid. 704). Green 
and Brock measured story-consistent beliefs, those whose contents were implications 
of the events in the narrative. Examples of such beliefs include ‘malls are not safe places’ 
(since that is where the murder occurred), ‘[psychiatric] patients should not be left 
unsupervised’ (since such a person committed the murder), and ‘the world is unjust’ 
(since the victim was an innocent child) (ibid. 705).
Participants were assigned to one of two conditions. In the fiction condition par-
ticipants were told that the events in the narrative were part of a short story, and that 
‘Resemblance to real persons and places is of course coincidental’ (ibid. 705). In the 
non-fiction condition participants were told that the narrative came from a newspaper 
and was a journalistic account. The texts were the same in content, but differed in 
presentation, in order to reflect their purported fiction/non-fiction status.
Participants responded to story-related belief statements anchored by ‘agree 
completely’ and ‘disagree completely’, completed source manipulation checks (in 
which they were asked whether the story was fiction or non-fiction), and were given a 
recall test about story details to check whether they had read the story carefully.
The results showed that story source (whether it was labelled as fiction or non- 
fiction) did not affect reported levels of transportation, nor did it make a difference to 
the effect on the participants’ beliefs after reading the narrative (ibid. 706). This result 
remained even when only looking at ‘individuals who correctly recalled the truth 
 status of the narrative . . . Fiction-nonfiction status did not affect transportation’ or 
‘responses on the belief indexes’ (ibid. 706).
Highly transported participants came away with beliefs in line with the story, and 
these results did not differ with respect to story source. Green and Brock note that 
‘Highly transported participants showed beliefs more consonant with story conclu-
sions as well as more positive evaluations of the story protagonists’, and they speculate 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 09/25/2017, SPi
Fictional Persuasion, Transparency, and the Aim of Belief 155
that ‘individuals altered their real-world beliefs in response to experiences in a story 
world’ (ibid. 707).
One methodological worry about Green and Brock’s experiment might be that the 
results are consistent with participants who already had story-consistent beliefs being 
more likely to experience higher levels of transportation into the narrative. Pre-empting 
this hypothesis, Green and Brock conducted another study with fifty participants, 
who filled in the story-related beliefs questionnaire, and then took part in the main 
experiment five to nine weeks later. Results indicated that ‘initial beliefs were not a 
 significant predictor of transportation’ (ibid. 707). So those who already have story 
consistent-beliefs are not more likely to experience higher levels of transportation. 
Rather, those who experience higher levels of transportation, are more likely to have 
story-consistent beliefs, regardless of story source.
Following this study, Green was interested in the relationship between transportation, 
perceived realism, and belief change. Perceived realism was understood as the perceived 
‘plausibility and realism of story events, settings, and characters’ (Green 2004: 252). 
Transportation was manipulated allowing for ‘a more direct test of the mediating role 
of perceived realism on the endorsement of story-relevant beliefs’ (ibid. 250).
Participants read a ‘first-person account of a gay man returning to his college frater-
nity for a reunion and encountering homophobia among current fraternity members’ 
(ibid. 254). In the high transportation group participants were encouraged to ‘relax 
and read the narrative as if you were leisurely reading a story in the comfort of your 
home’ (ibid. 254–5). In the low transportation group participants were instructed to 
‘think carefully about the arguments, statements and beliefs the characters and settings 
seem to depict’, and the control group received no instructions about reading style 
(ibid. 255). After reading, the participants reported on their transportation into the 
narrative, perceived realism, and gave responses to belief statements which were 
implied by the story, and information relating to their prior familiarity with the themes 
of the story (ibid. 253).
Transportation was measured using the same self-report scale as used in Green 
and Brock’s experiment (2000), summarized above. Perceived realism was measured 
using a version of Elliott and colleagues’ (1983) Perceived Plausibility Subscale of the 
Perceived Reality Scale. Questions were about how realistic and believable the story’s 
characters, setting, and dialogue were, for example: ‘People in this narrative are like 
people you or I might actually know’ (Green 2004: 256).
Pre-reading instructions did not affect reported levels of transportation into the 
narrative but transportation was correlated with perceived realism—the more trans-
ported participants were, the more they felt that the events and characters of the story 
were believable. Implications of the narrative became part of participants’ real-world 
beliefs. Prior familiarity with story themes increased transportation, which was asso-
ciated with greater perceptions of realism and endorsing more story-consistent beliefs 
(ibid. 260). This relationship between levels of transportation and endorsing story-
consistent beliefs remained even when familiarity was controlled for (ibid. 263). 
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Increased perceptions of realism were not related to story-consistent beliefs. Green 
suggests that this might show that perceived realism ‘may be a side effect of transporta-
tion rather than the mechanism for affecting beliefs’ (ibid. 263). So though there is a 
relationship between levels of transportation and endorsing story consistent beliefs, 
and though transportation is correlated with perceived realism, increased perceived 
realism itself is not related to story-consistent beliefs.
1.2 Warnings and belief change
In three experiments, Elizabeth J. Marsh and Lisa K. Fazio focused on whether pre-
warnings or post-warnings made a difference to the effects of narratives on a test of 
general knowledge; for reasons of space, we discuss only their first experiment here. 
Participants read four stories which each contained eight references to facts taken 
from Nelson and Narens’s (1980) general knowledge norms (four defined as ‘high prior 
knowledge’, answered correctly by 70 per cent of Nelson and Narens’s participants, and 
four defined as ‘low prior knowledge’, answered correctly by 15 per cent of Nelson and 
Narens’s participants). Half of the facts were framed correctly (providing the correct 
answer), and half were framed incorrectly, but plausibly (providing an incorrect answer). 
For example, consider the question ‘What is the name of the navigation instrument 
used at sea to plot position by the stars?’ The item as presented in the correct framing 
condition appeared as ‘This here, this is a sextant and it’s the main tool used at sea to 
navigate via the stars’. In the misleading condition it appeared as ‘This here, this is a 
compass and it’s the main tool used at sea to navigate via the stars’ (Marsh and Fazio 
2006: 1141). The participants completed a general knowledge test composed of ninety-six 
questions, sixty-four of which were questions relating to story content, and thirty-two 
were filler questions.
Subjects in the warning-before condition were told that the stories they would read 
were fictional, and received the following warning (read out by the experimenter 
before the story-reading phase and printed on a piece of paper):
Authors of fiction often take liberties with certain facts or ideas in order to make the story 
flow better or be more entertaining. Therefore, some of the information you will read may be 
incorrect. (ibid. 1142)
Subjects in the warning-after condition were told that the stories they read were fictional, 
and received the same warning, except in the past tense (i.e. ‘some of the information 
you read may have been incorrect’), given before the general knowledge test.
Subjects were instructed not to guess in the general knowledge test. Warnings 
were found to have an effect: those subjects who were in either warning condition 
produced less errors in the general knowledge test. However, the errors reduced were 
not specifically errors which had been read in the story, and so there was not a reduction 
in misinformation production (defined as ‘producing the specific incorrect answer 
that was presented in the stories’ (ibid. 1147)). So warnings did not reduce reliance 
on fiction.
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In their discussion Marsh and Fazio note that across all experiments participants relied 
on fictional sources—as evidenced by their answers in general knowledge tests—despite 
experimental manipulations which were designed to reduce suggestibility (such as 
warnings) (ibid. 1147). In their first experiment, discussed here, pre-warnings and post-
warnings affected the overall amount of errors, but did not reduce story-specific errors 
(ibid. 1147).
To sum up our overview of some of the empirical work on beliefs from fiction: Green 
and Brock (2000) were interested in the effects of transportation on real-world beliefs, 
with story source manipulations. They found that higher rates of transportation affected 
real-world beliefs, and knowing the source of the narrative (whether it was fiction 
or non-fiction) affected neither levels of transportation nor story-consistent beliefs. 
Following up on this work, Green (2004) was interested in the effect of familiarity 
and perceived realism on transportation and story-consistent beliefs. She found 
that transportation was correlated with higher perceived realism and familiarity, as 
well as endorsing more story-consistent beliefs. Finally, Marsh and Fazio investigated 
the effects of pre-read and post-read warnings on belief change. They found that 
warnings contributed to lower error rates overall but did not make a difference to 
story-specific errors.
Now that we have given a summary of some of the literature on generating attitudes 
from fiction, we turn to the teleological account of belief, for which such literature, we 
claim, presents a problem.
2 Transparency and the teleological account of belief
Philosophers have been interested in the best way to understand the connection 
between belief and truth, which is indicated by several features of belief. One such 
feature is transparency. Transparency is the fact that ‘when asking oneself whether to 
believe that p’ one must ‘immediately recognize that this question is settled by, and only 
by, answering the question whether p is true’ (Shah 2003: 447). Truth is not an optional 
end in deliberation over what to believe which provides an ‘instrumental or extrinsic 
reason that an agent may take or leave at will’ (ibid. 447). If it were then the agent would 
have to make an inference from discovering that p is true and determining whether she 
ought to believe it, perhaps via what Shah calls a ‘bridge premise’ relating to whether or 
not it is good to have a true belief with respect to p. But ‘there is no such gap between 
the two questions within the first-personal deliberative perspective; the question 
whether to believe that p collapses into the question whether p is true’ (ibid. 447).
Transparency is not such that deliberative beliefs are formed exclusively via consid-
erations relating to the truth of p, rather, it is just the fact that ‘one cannot deliberatively, 
and in full awareness, let one’s beliefs be guided by anything but truth’ (Steglich-Petersen 
2006: 503). This is not to say that in fact deliberative beliefs cannot be influenced by 
non-epistemic factors, rather, it is just that the deliberator cannot take them to be so 
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influenced, first-personally, while deliberating. Provided that these non-epistemic 
factors are not acknowledged by the deliberator, transparency does not rule out their 
influencing the content or fixation of deliberative beliefs.
An account of belief should explain why the question whether to believe that p 
collapses into the question whether p is true in deliberation over what to believe. To 
explain why questions of the first kind collapse into, and are answered by, questions of 
the second kind, philosophers have adopted one of two strategies, broadly conceived. 
Normative theorists claim that we can explain transparency by appeal to a norm which 
governs belief: when a subject moves from the question whether to believe that p to 
the question whether p is true, she manifests her commitment to the truth norm (see 
e.g. Shah 2003; and Shah and Velleman 2005).1 We set this view aside and focus on 
teleological accounts in this chapter. Such accounts have it that belief is constitutively 
aim governed; here we discuss the truth aim teleological account. We focus on Steglich-
Petersen’s account because he has given the most attention to formulating it in a way 
which answers the teleologist’s dilemma (outlined in the next section), which will 
concern us here.
The teleological account has it that ‘believing that p essentially involves having as an 
aim to believe p truly’ (Steglich-Petersen 2009: 395, our emphasis). The aim of belief is 
realized in one of two ways. In the deliberative case in which the subject deliberates 
over what to believe the aim is realized in the subject’s intentions qua a believer. In the 
non-deliberative case in which the subject does not deliberate over what to believe the 
aim is realized by ‘some sub-intentional surrogate of such intentions in the form of 
truth-regulated . . . mechanisms’ (Steglich-Petersen 2006: 510). Having the aim of truth 
is claimed to demarcate beliefs from other cognitive attitudes.2
It is by appeal to the aim of belief that teleologists explain transparency: when we 
deliberate over whether to believe some proposition p, transparency ‘can be explained by 
the aim one necessarily adopts in posing that question, because the only considerations 
that could decide whether believing p would further that aim are considerations that 
bear on whether p is true’3 (Steglich-Petersen 2008: 546).
We turn now to the teleologist’s dilemma which takes issue with this explanation.
3 The teleologist’s dilemma
Shah argues that the teleologist finds herself on the horns of a dilemma in claiming 
that an aim to accept a truth is a necessary and sufficient condition for a state to be a 
belief. This is because non-deliberative beliefs (those beliefs which are not formed as 
1 One of us does not think that the explanation of transparency offered by normative theorists works, 
though we do not argue that here (see Sullivan-Bissett forthcoming; Noordhof m.s. and Sullivan-Bissett).
2 Though we note that guessing might be aimed at truth (see Owens 2003).
3 One of us does not endorse this explanation for independent reasons (see Sullivan-Bissett forthcom-
ing for an argument against the teleological explanation of transparency).
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a result of our aiming to accept a truth, and which are not characterized by transparency) 
need to be accounted for by the teleologist.
The teleologist’s story about these non-deliberative beliefs is that there are some 
mechanisms or dispositions which constitute aiming at the truth in the absence of 
the subject having a personal-level aim to believe truly. The issue is that whatever the 
teleologist has in mind in the case of sub-intentional mechanisms aiming at truth, it 
had better be the case that non-deliberative beliefs get through that net, since the 
account has it that all beliefs share the feature of being truth-aimed. Thinking in terms 
of truth regulation, understood as the amount of influence truth has on the fixation of 
belief, the teleologist might cast the truth regulation in the non-deliberative case as 
rather weak, since in some cases of non-deliberative belief, the role of truth played 
looks like a weak one (self-deceptive beliefs for example). However, the teleologist also 
needs to account for why, when one forms a deliberative belief (which is after all, just 
one way in which one can form a belief), truth is, by the agent’s lights, the only relevant 
consideration for her, to the exclusion of all other considerations, in coming to a belief. 
To do this, the teleologist might understand the truth regulation secured by the aim as 
rather strong, but if she does this, she would find herself unable to account for those 
non-deliberative beliefs which look weakly regulated for truth (Shah 2003: 461–3). The 
challenge for the teleologist is to explain the deliberative case characterized by trans-
parency, but to do this in a way which does not exclude non-deliberative beliefs, those 
not characterized by transparency, from qualifying as beliefs.
The problem is that the teleologist seeks to give an account of belief as being brought 
about through the aim of an agent or some sub-intentional surrogate of that aim, and 
this is supposed to be a demarcating feature of the attitude of belief. However, on the 
first horn, if she construes the disposition which constitutes aiming at truth as quite 
strong (and perhaps she ought to do this in order to account for transparency), then 
she is unable to capture non-deliberative beliefs, which she claims are aimed at truth, 
albeit sub-intentionally. On the second horn, if she construes the truth-regulatory 
mechanisms or dispositions which constitute aiming at truth in the  non-deliberative 
case as rather weak (and perhaps she ought to since at least some beliefs look less 
strongly regulated for truth), then she is unable to explain the transparency which 
characterizes deliberative belief formation, when we are aiming at truth at the 
agent level.
3.1 A teleological response to the dilemma
Steglich-Petersen responds to the teleologist’s dilemma by claiming that what demar-
cates the attitude of belief is being regulated for truth, and such truth regulation is had 
in virtue of beliefs being aimed at truth. Steglich-Petersen claims that whether a cogni-
tive process is, de facto, weakly regulated for truth is independent of any aim of an 
agent. So, we can say that the attitudes resulting from processes of non-deliberative 
belief formation count as beliefs because the characteristic of weak truth regulation 
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that they have is shared by cognitive states which have that very characteristic in virtue 
of their relation to aims of a believer (Steglich-Petersen 2006: 515).
This teleological response requires the truth regulation present in deliberative 
and non-deliberative belief formation to be the same, given that the claim is that such 
regulation is a feature which the two resulting attitudes share which classifies them 
all as beliefs. Prima facie, the regulation present in deliberative belief formation, the 
kind characterized by transparency to truth considerations, is rather strong. However, 
Steglich-Petersen notes that ‘even conscious doxastic deliberation is de facto merely 
weakly regulated for truth’ given an agent’s epistemic fallibility (ibid. 511; Steglich-
Petersen, Chapter 10 in this volume p. 189). This is to say, when in the business of delib-
erating over whether to believe that p, we might take ourselves to be rather 
epistemically vigilant. However, given the possibility of failures of attention to appro-
priate evidence, motivational factors, and so on, our resulting beliefs are, as it turns out, 
only weakly regulated for truth.
The response to the dilemma is as follows: what demarcates beliefs from other 
attitudes is the descriptive characteristic of weak truth regulation, secured by the aim 
of truth. The strength of regulation is glossed in terms of how many non-truth factors 
are playing a role in the fixation of belief. Steglich-Petersen’s move is to say that in every 
case of belief—including those formed transparently—there are many non-truth 
related factors involved. The claim that all beliefs share the feature of weak truth 
regulation keeps the unity about belief, and gives a necessary and sufficient condition 
for something to be a belief. This is compatible with an explanation of transparency 
because as a matter of fact, there are many factors involved in determining what 
one  believes, but from the first-person perspective, one responds only to truth 
considerations.
Next we argue that beliefs from fiction put pressure on the claim that there is a regu-
latory feature shared by all beliefs which acts as a demarcating feature of them, and 
thus the challenge of the teleologist’s dilemma remains.
4 Beliefs from fiction and the teleologist’s dilemma
Here we draw on the material in Section 1 of this chapter to give a version of the 
dilemma which appeals to beliefs from fiction. We will argue that in light of this more 
particular version of the dilemma, the response offered to it by Steglich-Petersen is 
inadequate because beliefs from fiction tell against the claim that there is a basic level 
of truth regulation common to all beliefs.
The studies we looked at point to cases of belief where regulation for truth by the 
aim is rather poor. In Green and Brock’s study we saw that if a reader is sufficiently 
engaged in a story, even if it is presented as a fictional story, ‘they may show effects of the 
story on their real-world beliefs’ (Green and Brock 2000: 701). Highly transported par-
ticipants came away with beliefs in line with the story, and these results did not differ 
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between the group in which the story was presented as a journalistic account, and the 
group in which the story was presented as fiction.
In Marsh and Fazio’s experiment participants relied on fictional sources to answer 
questions on a general knowledge test, despite warnings. Though the warnings affected 
the overall amount of errors, they did not reduce story-specific errors. Subjects may 
have been more careful in general in answering questions on the test, but the warnings 
did not help subjects filter out or ignore information they had read in the fiction before 
the test.
These are cases in which, whether regulation for truth is secured by the personal 
level aim of the agent, or some sub-intentional surrogate of such an aim, such regula-
tion is weaker than the regulation we see in at least some other cases of belief, most 
obviously, the deliberative case characterized by transparency. As Stacie Friend notes, 
studies on fictional persuasion show that ‘we fail to scrutinize information when we 
are engaged with stories, making it more likely that we will accept and eventually 
believe what we read regardless of its veracity’ (Friend 2014: 234). The findings from 
these studies ‘represent a pattern of belief formation that systematically fails to be 
truth-sensitive’ (Steglich-Petersen, Chapter  10 in this volume, p. 181). Note that 
whether the beliefs from fiction identified in the experiments we cite are deliberative 
or non-deliberative beliefs does not affect our argument. If they are cases of non-delib-
erative belief, they plug into the teleologist’s dilemma rather neatly: they contrast with 
deliberative beliefs characterized by transparency, insofar as they are beliefs which 
require us to posit an even lower standard of regulation, distinct from Steglich-
Petersen’s weak standard. If they are cases of deliberative belief, then, as we learned from 
Green and Brock’s study, even if the subject takes herself to be responding only to truth 
considerations, the transportative experience is such as to alter the product of the 
deliberation. We can say this because in the pre-experiments Green and Brock found 
that beliefs before reading the narrative were not a predictor of beliefs after reading the 
narrative, but transportation is (Green and Brock 2000: 707). We cannot say that the 
belief change in these cases is because the subject’s evidence has changed, since in these 
experiments subjects are told that the account is fictional and thus it cannot play the 
evidential role required for it to be the case that the subject’s evidence has changed, in 
line with a basic level of truth regulation.
Perhaps the teleologist might say something like the following: when something is 
presented as fiction and a subject is transported, the subject is still aiming at truth. She 
takes it to be the case that some general proposition—in this case some proposition 
about the dangers of psychiatric patients—is true, and so forms a belief in the propos-
ition. The compelling nature of the story reveals the truth of the general proposition. 
The subject is still aiming at truth, and her beliefs are weakly regulated for truth.4
This is problematic. It might be the case that the subject takes it that the compelling 
nature of the story reveals the truth of the general proposition, but she should not so 
4 Thanks to Paul Noordhof for suggesting this line of argument.
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take it. It is compatible with taking one’s beliefs to be very strongly regulated by truth 
when they are not. What we know about transportation provides reasons for thinking 
that subjects in such cases are not guided by truth: ‘transportation into a story causes 
people to be less motivated (or less able) to disbelieve any particular conclusion; trans-
ported individuals are so absorbed in the story that they would likely be reluctant to stop 
and critically analyze propositions presented therein’ (ibid. 703). The regulation for truth 
in this case of belief formation is weaker than in other cases (the non-transportative 
deliberative case, for example). The subject might take herself to be trying to form a 
true belief, insofar as that is what she thinks she is up to, but the strength of the truth 
regulation in such a case is weaker than non-transportative cases, and so puts pressure 
on the claim that the shared feature of weak truth regulation classifies this as a case of 
belief. It is not enough for the teleological account that the subject in the transportative 
case takes herself to be aiming at truth. This is because our point is one about a difference 
in degree: if we can demonstrate a difference in degree with respect to truth regulation 
for some cases of belief, then we have shown the implausibility of claiming a basic level 
of truth regulation common to all beliefs, which is supposed to be secured by the aim 
of truth posited by teleologists.
Beliefs from fiction are influenced by the transportative experience, and there is a 
difference in degree with respect to the truth regulation which goes on in such cases, 
and in the deliberative case where the subject is being careful. When people form 
beliefs upon engaging with fiction, even when they are told that it is fiction, there is a 
sense in which they should not be forming beliefs in such cases. But, we still want to call 
those resulting attitudes beliefs, how do we justify that? The teleologist has to say that it 
is because they share some basic level of truth regulation with other beliefs: beliefs 
from fiction share some feature with other beliefs grounded upon their being governed 
by an aim. This is the claim we want to resist.
It is no argument against the teleological account that beliefs from fiction are often 
false—this is consistent with truth regulation being weak (it is even consistent with 
truth regulation being strong!). What is important is that the fixation of beliefs from 
fiction is influenced by non-epistemic factors, which suggests that the truth regulation 
present in this case is weaker than the truth regulation present in cases in which one 
deliberates and comes to a belief, without having been transported. Even if beliefs 
arising out of transportation are deliberative beliefs—so that having read the fiction, 
we ask somebody the question of whether they believe psychiatric patients present a 
danger, and they deliberate, and reasons for them being a danger are salient and so they 
form a belief—this is still a problem for the teleological account because the transportative 
experience has influenced the product of deliberation and produced a belief which is 
less strongly regulated for truth.
Recall that Green found that transportation was correlated with perceived realism 
and more story-consistent beliefs. One might think that perceived realism increased 
story-consistent beliefs in a way rather congenial to the teleological account. If subjects 
came away with story-consistent beliefs because they thought that the story was 
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realistic, perhaps the story acted as a reminder or signal for how things are in the world. 
If I read a narrative and think that it is rather realistic, and it is because of the perceived 
realism that I go on to form beliefs which are consistent with the story, perhaps my 
beliefs are weakly regulated for truth. However, we saw that increased perceptions of 
realism were not related to story-consistent beliefs, suggesting that perceived realism 
may be an effect of transportation and not a mechanism for belief change (Green 2004: 
263). The causal arrow goes from transportation to perceived realism, so the teleologist 
cannot claim that the correlation between perceived realism and story-consistent 
beliefs shows that perceived realism is an epistemically good, truth regulative way of 
gaining beliefs from fiction.
One worry about our strategy here is that we are pointing only to a difference in 
regulation in degree, and not in kind, and this is consistent with Steglich-Petersen’s 
characterization of the truth regulation being ‘weak’ in both cases. The beliefs gained 
from fiction and reproduced on questionnaires of beliefs and general knowledge tests 
might not be very well regulated for truth, but perhaps they do reach what might be a 
very low bar of weak truth regulation. However, Steglich-Petersen himself is at pains to 
point out at the start of his response to the teleologist’s dilemma that the regulation 
present in the deliberative case is not strong, objectively speaking, it is weak, a charac-
teristic it shares with non-deliberative belief formation (Steglich-Petersen 2006: 511). 
If a difference in degree were not enough to make trouble for the teleologist, we would 
not expect Steglich-Petersen to worry about it when he articulates his response. So we 
take it that a difference in degree between the regulation present in some deliberative 
cases and the beliefs from fiction cases is sufficient to cause problems for the teleological 
account. Though we can accept that regulation for truth in deliberation is weaker than 
it feels first personally, it is different from the truth regulation present in cases of belief 
from fiction which we have outlined here. One should also be aware that the weaker 
we go with respect to the truth regulation distinctive of belief, the less able we are 
to  explain the seemingly strong truth regulation secured by transparency in the 
deliberative case.5
Let us briefly consider three possible models of fictional persuasion as outlined by 
Steglich-Petersen (Chapter 10 in this volume), to show that whichever model one 
adopts of what is going on in fictional persuasion, it is clear that weaker truth regulation 
is involved in the fixation of belief in such a context. According to the Gilbert Model, 
5 Steglich-Petersen claims that in this chapter we overestimate the de facto basic level of truth regula-
tion, and that even in cases of deliberative beliefs it is very low—consider cases of bias or distraction, which 
nevertheless exhibit transparency (Steglich-Petersen, Chapter 10 in this volume p. 190). He takes this point 
to support the claim that the level of truth regulation distinctive of belief is low enough that cases of belief 
from fiction pose no worry: even in cases of transparent deliberation we can have very poor regulation for 
truth. However, one might equally take the point to demonstrate that beliefs from fiction are just one of 
many cases that put pressure on the claim that there is a basic level of truth regulation common to all beliefs. 
And, as we note, the weaker the teleologist goes with respect to the level of truth regulation putatively 
distinctive of belief to accommodate such cases, the less plausible it looks that transparency can be explained 
by appeal to this regulation secured by a subject’s aim to believe truly.
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drawing on the work of Dan Gilbert (1991) and colleagues (1993) beliefs can linger 
when we are prevented from weeding them out, and in cases of beliefs from fiction it 
might be that transportation is the mechanism for such prevention. If this is right, 
transportation prevents subjects from ‘weeding out’ beliefs that they otherwise would 
have were they not transported, and this supports the claim that beliefs from fiction are 
less strongly regulated for truth than some other beliefs.
According to the Availability Heuristic Model as suggested by Anna Ichino and 
Gregory Currie (Chapter 4 in this volume), the availability heuristic is a mental 
shortcut which relies on the ease of cognitive retrieval when we make judgements 
about the probability of events. So, when participants engage with fiction, various 
examples of events, associations, and so on are made salient and thus easy to retrieve. If 
this model is right, then again we have support for the claim that beliefs from fiction 
are less well-regulated for truth—reading fiction makes salient items which then 
inform subsequent beliefs.
Finally, consider a model according to which fictional persuasion is an evolved 
cognitive process developed for information acquisition for foraging purposes (see 
Sugiyama 2001). According to this model we have evolved to be disposed to ‘take up 
beliefs when processing narrative’ (Steglich-Petersen, Chapter 10 in this volume, p. 187). 
Once again, if this were the right explanation of fictional persuasion it supports our 
claim that the truth regulation which goes on in these cases is at least different in degree 
from the regulation that goes on in at least some other belief formation.
To sum up our argument: the teleologist’s dilemma challenged the teleologist to give 
a descriptive account which both explained transparency and did not exclude non-
deliberative beliefs from counting as beliefs. In response, Steglich-Petersen claimed that 
due to our epistemic fallibility, even beliefs from deliberation are only weakly regulated 
for truth, and this feature of weak truth regulation is shared by non-deliberative beliefs. 
Further, the reason we get to call these non-deliberative states beliefs on teleological 
grounds is because they share the feature of weak truth regulation with deliberative 
cognitive states which have that feature in virtue of their relation to intentional aims of 
a believer.
We claimed that beliefs from fiction are problematic for this line of response. This is 
because the fixation of belief in such cases is less well-regulated for truth, and hence 
it is difficult to group all beliefs together by appeal to the claim that they share some 
regulatory feature. It is thus implausible to suggest that the reason attitudes from fiction 
are beliefs is because they share some regulatory feature with other beliefs. We considered 
three models of fictional persuasion and suggested that on any one of them, regulation 
for truth comes out as weaker for cases of beliefs from fiction than at least some other 
cases of belief. If truth regulation of different strengths goes on, and it is by appeal to 
this regulation that we classify beliefs, then why count attitudes from fiction as beliefs if 
one is a teleologist? The case of beliefs from fiction then revives the teleologist’s 
dilemma, and demonstrates that it is yet to be answered.
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In the next two sections we consider two objections to our argument and offer 
responses to them.
5 Objection one: attitudes from transportation  
are not beliefs
One response to the challenge that putative beliefs from fiction pose to the teleological 
view is to claim that these attitudes are not instances of belief. People do not genuinely 
believe that, for example, malls are dangerous places, they just believe that they believe 
that malls are dangerous places.
On what basis can it be denied that people’s responses to fiction are doxastic? Here 
are some options, based on how beliefs behave, or on the ‘job description’ usually 
attached to beliefs (Schwitzgebel 2001):
(i) Input considerations: beliefs need to be based on evidence and attitudes from fiction are 
not. Fictional accounts are not always evidence for beliefs, even if people mistakenly take 
them to be.
(ii) Output considerations: beliefs typically guide action and are predictive of people’s future 
behaviour but attitudes from fiction do not guide action and are not predictive of people’s 
future behaviour.
(iii) Rationality constraints: beliefs are governed by norms of rationality. How to characterize 
such norms is controversial, but many philosophers who take beliefs to be governed by norms 
of rationality would take it that beliefs need to cohere with the person’s other beliefs (procedural 
rationality) and need to be responsive to evidence (epistemic rationality). Attitudes from fiction 
do not satisfy such criteria.
Is it a belief one reports when one says that psychiatric patients who live in an institution 
should not be allowed to go out in the community during the day, or asserts that malls 
are dangerous places, after being transported by a fictional text in which a crime is 
committed in a mall by someone who escaped a psychiatric institution? What is the 
alternative to seeing transportation as unduly influencing the formation of beliefs? 
How do we explain why people ascribe to themselves the belief that, for example, malls 
are dangerous places if they do not really believe it?
One explanation of the only apparent doxastic nature of attitudes from fiction is that 
people make a mistake when they attribute a belief to themselves (this is often called in 
other contexts a metacognitive account; see Currie (2000) for an influential version of 
this view as applied to delusional attitudes). Just because participants profess to believe 
that malls are dangerous places, it does not mean that they do in fact believe that. One 
possibility is that, when subjects profess to believe that malls are dangerous places, they 
mistake the state they are in (e.g. an emotional reaction or an act of imagination) for a belief.
There are two main concerns with this view, and good reasons to take these concerns 
seriously. The first is that the non-doxastic view about beliefs from fiction takes only 
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some forms of behaviour as legitimate evidence for belief where the distinction between 
such forms of behaviour is questionable. The second concern is that, in order to be 
consistent, the non-doxastic view about attitudes from fiction needs to apply to other 
belief-like states that fail to satisfy conditions (i), (ii), and (iii), but that are commonly 
described as beliefs. This revisionist move might appeal to some (e.g. Ichino 2015) but 
has important implications for our notion of belief that should not be underestimated.
Let us start with the role of different forms of behaviour as evidence for belief claims. 
It would seem that whether people avoid malls six months after asserting that they 
are dangerous places counts as evidence for their believing what they asserted (as the 
attitude has the expected predictive power). But when people respond to questioning 
in a sincere manner, reporting an attitude that they are able to defend with reasons, this 
does not count as evidence for their believing what they are reporting. Although people 
are of course fallible when they ascribe attitudes to themselves and others, refusing to 
take their verbal behaviour as evidence for their believing that malls are dangerous places 
is a move that needs to be strongly motivated. We cannot think of a strong motivation 
for this move.
Let us turn to the status of other attitudes that fail to satisfy the job description of 
beliefs. If we take it that an attitude needs to be based on evidence (input considerations), 
guide action and be predictive of future behaviour (output considerations), and obey 
procedural and epistemic norms (rationality considerations) in order to be a belief, 
we need to apply this set of constraints across the board and be prepared to develop 
non-doxastic accounts of many attitudes we routinely describe as beliefs. This may turn 
out to be a radically revisionist project given our current folk-psychological practices. 
Common instances of self-deception, superstitious beliefs, religious beliefs, prejudiced 
beliefs, and self-serving beliefs (to mention just a few types of attitudes) would have 
to be re-described, with the curious result that only well-behaved attitudes count 
as beliefs.
Another option for those who want to resist the idea that transportation directly 
contributes to the formation of beliefs, and that people genuinely believe what they 
assert after being exposed to, and transported by, fictional accounts, is to argue that 
the mental states of people affected by transportation start as emotional reactions or 
imaginings, and then become beliefs. This account would have to explain how the 
initial state gives rise to beliefs, but such an explanation may not be difficult to provide. 
Perhaps feeling a strong emotion or having imagined something to be the case disposes 
people to pay selective attention to evidence for a state of affairs, indirectly contributing 
to the formation of a belief. However, this line would not help the teleologist, since it 
does nothing to suggest that the resulting beliefs are any better regulated for truth than 
they would be were transportation to play a more direct role in their formation.
A thorough examination of the debate would take more room than we can afford 
(for a more thorough defence of the doxastic nature of attitudes from fiction, see 
Buckwalter and Tullmann, Chapter 11 in this volume). Here, we are going to consider 
one issue that has been raised by Currie and Ichino (Chapter 4 in this volume) and 
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Friend (2014: 238) concerning the doxastic nature of attitudes from fiction: that these 
cases do not involve beliefs because the reported attitudes lack stability:
one may ask how long-lasting these effects were; other experiments of this kind have found 
reversion to pre-test attitudes within days or hours, [. . .] and readers’ responses may have been 
indicative of temporary changes in mood rather than of belief changes.
(Ichino and Currie, Chapter 4 in this volume, p. 66)
The instability of such attitudes is something that would speak against both output 
considerations and rationality constraints, given that we expect a subject’s beliefs 
(especially her general beliefs about how the world is likely to be) to be at the same time 
predictive of her behaviour and consistent with her other beliefs. If attitudes from 
fiction do not play the role of guiding the subject’s future action, if they are dismissed 
before they can exert influence on behaviour, and if they are also inconsistent with 
beliefs she formed in an empirically adequate way, then maybe they are not worthy 
of belief status.
This line of argument is attractive as we tend to view beliefs as somewhat stable, but 
with stability we may be setting the bar too high for attitudes to qualify as beliefs. Why 
should we think that an attitude’s stability is a condition for its being a belief? One issue 
is the vagueness of the notion of stability. How long should an attitude last and 
influence behaviour to be regarded as a genuine belief? Can one not form a belief 
and realize soon after (maybe in the space of the same conversation) that the belief was 
unfounded and should be abandoned? There is no reason to rule out that beliefs can be 
updated and revised, even rejected, within a relatively short time. The requirement of 
stability for beliefs seems to clash oddly with the requirement of their revisability,6 and 
those endorsing stability need to provide a clear sense in which this notion demarcates 
beliefs from other mental states.
Let us assume that, for example, the attitudes reported after reading Murder at the 
Mall, are not stable and that in time participants come to abandon the idea that malls 
are dangerous and that people diagnosed with psychiatric disorders should be locked 
up. We could take the fact that readers’ attitudes from fiction do not survive as evi-
dence that such attitudes were never beliefs, or instead, we could argue that the par-
ticipants did form beliefs about the dangerousness of malls and then simply abandoned 
such beliefs at a later stage. Given that there is no reason to deny the possibility of belief 
change, the burden is on the non-doxasticist to motivate a preference for taking the 
participants to have never had the beliefs over taking the participants to no longer have 
the beliefs or to have forgotten the grounds for the beliefs.
6 Indeed, Steglich-Petersen argues that if attitudes from fiction are not stable, this feature of them shows 
that they are regulated for truth to the requisite degree to count as beliefs on the truth-aim account. Thus 
he makes the point that the truth regulation required for a response to the teleologist’s dilemma does not 
need to come at belief formation, but can come at the stage of belief regulation (Steglich-Petersen, 
Chapter 10 in this volume pp. 189–90). Instability then is used here to support the claim that these attitudes 
are indeed beliefs.
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The same choice presents itself in the case of other attitudes that lack stability. The 
pattern of behaviour by the participants in Green and Brock’s study is analogous to that 
of participants in the introspective effects literature. In a classic series of studies on 
dating couples (Seligman et al. 1980 and Wilson and Kraft 1993), it was shown that 
attitudes about one’s relationships, and predictions of the future of one’s relationships, 
could be easily biased by changing the experimenter’s style of questioning. Moreover, 
the attitudes manipulated in this way were shown to be ‘fickle’ and lack predictive 
power. Arguably, this case is analogous to the case of attitudes from fiction, because 
we could conceive of transportation as a way in which experimenters manipulate 
participants’ attitudes. By eliciting transportation, experimenters dispose participants 
to report attitudes that are consistent with the fictional account, because of the vividness 
and accessibility of the fictional story.
In the dating couples’ experiments, does the fact that the participants’ actions after 
the study were not consistent with the attitudes avowed during the study suggest that such 
attitudes were not beliefs? Or does it suggest that in the following weeks participants 
changed their minds and no longer endorsed the attitude that they reported on the day 
of the experiment? Similar questions could be asked concerning the participants in 
Green and Brock’s study, and indeed in the other studies overviewed in Section 1 of 
this chapter. Do they believe that malls are dangerous places during the study and then 
change their minds after the study? One explanation that could account for a change 
in attitudes in these cases relies on salience (see also Friend 2014: 239). Relevant 
information is made salient to participants at the time when they are first asked to 
report their attitudes, but is no longer salient at a later time when they are asked about 
their attitudes again, or when their relevant behaviour is observed. This effect of salience 
can be regarded as a mark of irrationality and as a source of biased judgement, but 
it does not rule out the possibility that people form beliefs as a result of manipulated 
information, and that these beliefs are then revised or rejected when such information 
stops being salient.
Our view then, is that the teleologist ought not respond to our objection by endorsing 
a non-doxastic position on attitudes from fiction.
6 Objection two: beliefs from transportation 
are truth-aimed
Earlier we argued that beliefs from fiction do not share the feature of weak truth 
regulation with other beliefs, and so the teleological account is unable to classify these 
attitudes as beliefs. Here is the second objection to our argument: these beliefs are truth-
aimed because the subjects in these studies implement a general tendency to form 
beliefs based on testimony, and they take the narratives they read to include or constitute 
author testimony. If the participants in the studies we have looked at are exercising such 
a tendency—and forming beliefs based on their trusting the author’s testimony—perhaps 
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their beliefs are aimed at truth, and share the feature of weak truth regulation with 
other beliefs.7
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the epistemology of testimony in 
any depth, and so we work through this objection to our argument without adopting 
any particular view thereof. For context, note that whilst reductionists about testimony 
require a testimonee to have non-testimony-based evidence for a belief based on testi-
mony to be justified, anti-reductionists do not place this requirement on justification 
for testimony-based beliefs. For our purposes what is important is that philosophers 
on both sides of this debate do require there not to be evidence which undermines the 
positive epistemic status of the belief (Stock, Chapter 2 in this volume).
With this in mind, let us return to the objection. Could the teleologist say that the 
participants in the fictional persuasion experiments were implementing a tendency 
to form beliefs on the basis of testimony, and these beliefs are thus justified? And for 
argument’s sake, let us say that if a belief is justified then it exhibits the basic level of 
truth regulation supposedly distinctive of belief on the teleological account. We think 
this is not, in fact, an option.
Though many epistemologists would agree that beliefs formed on the basis of 
testimony are justified ones, they would not think that this claim is applicable to the 
cases in question. As we saw earlier, as part of Green and Brock’s experiments, subjects 
were assigned to one of two conditions: the fiction condition, or the non-fiction condition. 
The texts the subjects were asked to read were the same in content, but differed in how 
they were presented, in order to reflect their truth status. Importantly, ‘These manipu-
lations were not subtle; the information was provided in bold, double-spaced print on 
top of the first page of the narrative, and the narratives were formatted to reflect 
the alleged source’ (Green and Brock 2000: 705). But this is not all. Not only were the 
subjects provided with information as to the supposed source of the text, they were 
also tested on this using source manipulation checks. In these checks ‘Participants 
were asked to indicate whether the story was fiction, nonfiction or “don’t know” ’ 
(ibid. 706). Some participants failed this check, by either mistaking the story source 
or not knowing it. However, what is pertinent here is the fact that ‘even if only individ-
uals who correctly recalled the truth status of the narrative . . . were considered, the 
basic pattern of results remained the same. Fiction-nonfiction status did not affect 
transportation’ (ibid. 706). Similarly, we saw that in Marsh and Fazio’s experiments, 
pre-warnings and post-warnings regarding the fictional status of the narrative read 
by participants did not make a difference to their use of fictional information to 
answer general knowledge questions.
So let us take the participants in Green and Brock’s fiction condition, or the participants 
in one of Marsh and Fazio’s warning conditions. If these participants formed their 
beliefs on the basis of (what they took to be) the author’s testimony, these beliefs would 
not be justified, since there is evidence which undermines the reliability of the putative 
7 We came across this line of response in an ancestor of Ichino and Currie (Chapter 4 in this volume).
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testifier (i.e. the stories’ authors). In these cases, participants were told that the narratives 
they read were fictional, and so it would have been very easy indeed for the narrative’s 
author to have said something false, thus providing undermining evidence of the 
author’s testimony.
Given this, the teleologist cannot take the claim that beliefs formed on the basis 
of testimony are justified ones to ground the weak truth regulation for beliefs from 
fiction. Since those who think that beliefs based on testimony can be justified, would 
not take the cases we have looked at to fall into that class.
It is not our argument that readers of fiction are never justified in forming beliefs via 
author testimony, or even that there is ‘an epistemic difference in kind between fiction 
and non-fiction’ (for an argument against this claim see Stock, Chapter 2 in this vol-
ume). Nor is it our argument that participants in these experiments were not justified 
in forming beliefs because of some fiction-specific feature (see Konrad, Chapter 3 and 
Stock, Chapter 2 in this volume for discussion of cases in which readers are justified in 
forming beliefs when reading fiction). Rather, our claim is that, in these experiments8 
participants would not be justified in forming beliefs upon what they take to be author 
testimony in the stories they read.
To sum up this section: to show that the objection does not work we noted that both 
reductionists and anti-reductionists in the epistemology of testimony require there 
to be an absence of evidence against the reliability of the testifier, for beliefs based on 
testimony to be justified. We claimed that given this requirement, weak truth regulation 
for beliefs based on fiction in these studies could not be based on a default assumption 
that beliefs based on testimony are justified. The teleologist faces a difficulty in trying 
to make a view about the reliability of testimony do this work. This is because no pro-
ponent of the view that a general tendency to form one’s beliefs upon testimony results 
in justified beliefs would think that this claim is applicable to the participants forming 
beliefs upon reading the fictional narratives in the studies we have discussed. This is 
because reductionists and anti-reductionists alike require an absence of evidence 
which speaks against the belief formed on the basis of testimony. In the empirical work 
we have discussed though, there is no such absence—participants were informed that 
the material they read is fictional, and may include falsehoods. Thus, if these participants 
really were exercising a tendency to form beliefs on the basis of testimony, such beliefs 
were not justified ones, and so it is not from these quarters that the teleologist can 
claim that such beliefs are, after all, regulated for truth.
8 An anti-reductionist about the justification of testimony might think that participants in the studies by 
Green and Brock (2000) and Green (2004) were in fact justified, since they were only told that the narrative 
was fictional, and if Stock and Konrad are right (Chapters 2 and 3 in this volume), that does not undermine 
their testimony imparting capabilities (though this will also depend on whether the conditions required for 
this are met in the narratives read). For those attracted to this line we restrict our conclusions in this section 
to the participants in Marsh and Fazio’s (2006) study, who were warned that the narratives may contain 
false items.
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7 Function-based teleology
We will finish by gesturing towards a teleological account of belief which does not run 
into the problems we have identified for the aim-based teleological account. One could 
understand belief ’s connection to truth by appeal to the biological functions of our 
mechanisms for belief production (see Millikan 1995a, 1995b, and for an explanation 
of transparency in these terms see Sullivan-Bissett forthcoming). As Steglich-Petersen 
notes (Chapter 10 in this volume), the findings from studies on fictional persuasion do 
not undermine a teleological account of this kind. Such findings bring to light a pat-
tern of belief formation which is not truth-sensitive, and so speak against the aim 
account of belief which makes a descriptive claim about all beliefs being weakly regu-
lated for truth. However, false beliefs, even a pattern of false beliefs, do not constitute a 
 counterexample to the claim that the biological function of our mechanisms of belief 
production is to produce true beliefs. This is because functions can fail to be per-
formed. On a historical view of function at least (the view accepted by proponents of 
this account of belief), something possesses a function because in certain key moments, 
the  performance of it contributed to the reproductive success of its bearers. So even 
though beliefs from fiction represent a group of beliefs which are insensitive—or at 
least, less sensitive—to truth, this does not speak against a teleological account of belief 
grounded in function. Beliefs from fiction are just ones which do not function very 
well, they do not do what they are supposed to do (unless one adopts Sugiyama’s account 
outlined in Section 4 of this chapter). These beliefs though do, as we have argued, speak 
against an aim-based teleological account which places a descriptive condition on 
belief in terms of truth regulation.
8 Conclusions
We began by giving an overview of some of the empirical literature which shows that 
subjects form beliefs upon reading fiction, even when the stories are presented as 
 fiction, and even when the subjects are warned that the fictions they will or have read 
may contain falsehoods. Next we outlined the phenomenon of transparency which 
characterizes our deliberative belief formation and requires an explanation from belief 
theorists. We discussed the teleological account of belief and its explanation of trans-
parency. Then we described Shah’s challenge to the teleological account, the teleologist’s 
dilemma. We outlined a response to the dilemma from Steglich-Petersen which had it 
that all beliefs are weakly regulated for truth. We then argued that beliefs from fiction 
show that this response to the dilemma is inadequate.
We considered two objections to our argument. The first was to take a non-doxastic 
approach to the attitudes gained from reading fiction. If such attitudes are not beliefs, 
the teleological account would not have to give an account of them. We responded to 
this objection by arguing for a doxastic reading of these attitudes, showing that they do 
indeed come under the teleological theorist’s remit. The second objection was that 
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readers in the experiments we discuss were treating the narratives as a source of testi-
mony, and given that beliefs based on testimony are justified, they were forming beliefs 
in an epistemically respectable way, and, more to the point, their beliefs were aimed at 
truth, and shared the feature of weak truth regulation with other beliefs. We responded 
to this by pointing out that the claim that beliefs based on testimony are justified is not 
applicable to the cases under discussion, since in such cases there is undermining evi-
dence for the testimony. Finally, we noted that not all teleological views will be vulner-
able to our argument, in particular, a biological function view about the connection 
between belief and truth, preferred by one of the authors, will not struggle to accom-
modate beliefs from fiction. The aim account though is vulnerable because it places a 
condition on belief which is supposed to both explain transparency and demarcate 
belief from other attitudes.
We conclude then that beliefs from fiction demonstrate a revival of the teleologist’s 
dilemma, which thus remains unanswered.
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